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 Intergovernmental Organizations and Foreign Policy Behavior:
 Some Empirical Findings*
 JAMES M. MCCORMICK
 YOUNG W. KIHL
 Iowa State University
 In this study, we evaluate whether the increase in the number of intergovernmental
 organizations (IGOs) has resulted in their increased use for foreign policy behavior by the nations
 of the world. This question is examined in three related ways: (1) the aggregate use of IGOs for
 foreign policy behavior; (2) the relationship between IGO membership and IGO use; and (3) the
 kinds of states that use IGOs. Our data base consists of the 35 nations in the CREON (Comparative
 Research on the Events of Nations) data set for the years 1959-1968.
 The main findings are that IGOs were employed over 60 percent of the time with little
 fluctuation on a year-by-year basis, that global and "high politics" IGOs were used more often than
 regional and "low politics" IGOs, that institutional membership and IGO use were generally
 inversely related, and that the attributes of the states had limited utility in accounting for the use
 of intergovernmental organizations. Some of the theoretical implications of these findings are then
 explored.
 The growth of intergovernmental organiza-
 tions (IGOs) has been astounding since the end
 of World War II. Although only about 100
 IGOs existed in 1950, the number of such
 organizations has reached well over 250 by the
 mid-1970s (Wallace and Singer, 1970, pp. 272,
 275-80; Kegley and Rochester, 1971, pp.
 403-04; and the Yearbook of International
 Organizations, 1974, 1977). Moreover, this
 growth has occurred not only in terms of
 geographical distribution of such organizations
 but also in terms of functional issues with
 which they deal. Despite a considerable litera-
 ture documenting this growth in the number
 and types of IGOs, only a scant amount of
 research relates this institutional growth to
 their use for coordinating foreign relations
 among nations.1 Thus we know little about the
 extent to which nations use IGOs as a foreign
 *Support for this research was provided by the
 Iowa State University Grants Committee in the form
 of an initiation grant to the first author. Special
 thanks are due Charles Hermann and his co-investi-
 gators on the CREON Project for allowing use of these
 data in this study. The Inter-University Consortium
 for Political and Social Research provided a copy of
 the CREON data set after the CREON investigators
 released it for use in this project. We also thank several
 reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier
 drafts. Neither the original collectors of the data, the
 Consortium, nor the reviewers bear any responsibility
 for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
 1For a review of the empirically based research on
 international organizations, see Alger (1970). Also, see
 Kihi (1971) for a previous study of IGO-nation-state
 linkage.
 policy forum, the kinds of nations that use
 them, and what impact such organizations have
 on the conduct of foreign policy behavior.
 In this study, we address some of these
 concerns by investigating empirically the link-
 age between foreign policy behavior and the use
 of intergovernmental organizations. Specifical-
 ly, we examine two interrelated sets of ques-
 tions. The first set of questions focuses upon
 the aggregate use of IGOs: (1) To what extent
 do nations employ IGOs for conducting foreign
 policy? (2) To what extent do nations use the
 various types of IGOs (e.g., global versus
 regional and "high politics" versus "low poli-
 tics") for this behavior? (3) Have these patterns
 changed over time? A second set of questions
 examines the characteristics of nations that act
 or interact with one another through IGOs. In
 particular, we focus upon the relationship
 between IGO membership and IGO use and
 between the national attributes of states and
 IGO use. The questions addressed here are: (1)
 Is IGO membership related to the use of these
 organizations? That is, do nations that hold
 memberships in a large number of IGOs also
 tend to employ them more frequently than
 those without such extensive memberships?
 Similarly, does this pattern hold when we
 examine the relationship between membership
 and the use of various types of organizations
 (global, regional, high politics, and low poli-
 tics)? (2) To what extent are specific national
 attributes (such as the relative size of the
 country and the level of economic develop-
 ment) related to IGO use by nations? Do small,
 developing states, for example, utilize IGOs
 more extensively than large, developed states?
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 What differences exist between states in their
 use of the different types of IGOs?
 Three important concepts frame our subse-
 quent discussion: IGOs, IGO use, and foreign
 policy behavior. While we discuss foreign policy
 behavior below, let us now define IGOs and
 IGO use. The term intergovernmental organiza-
 tions (IGOs) refers to those organizations which
 have nations as members in contrast to non-
 governmental organizations (NGOs) which have
 individuals and private groups as members. The
 specific definitional criteria used to identify
 IGOs followed the standards set down by the
 United Nations and the Yearbook of Inter-
 national Organizations: "All organizations es-
 tablished by agreements to which three States
 or more are parties. . . ." Using these criteria,
 the IGOs included here ranged from such
 well-known organizations as the United Nations
 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to
 such lesser-known organizations as the Cocoa
 Producers Alliance and the International Com-
 mission for the Protection of the Rhine. IGO
 use refers to any activity by a nation in which
 an intergovernmental organization is engaged as
 a forum for fostering national policy, as an
 instrument of that policy, or as an arena for
 coordinating behavior with other states.2 Some
 illustrations of foreign policy behavior within
 IGOs (taken from the data set discussed below)
 might be helpful in clarifying our definition.
 Activities within IGOs ranged, for example,
 from the United States giving assurances to
 their NATO allies against external threats, to
 Kenya, at a meeting of the Organization of
 African Unity, accepting an offer from Zambia
 to mediate its border dispute with Somalia to
 Venezuela asking the Organization of American
 States to take action against Cuban aggression.
 The Data
 The evidence with which to answer our
 research questions was drawn from the data set
 compiled by Charles Hermann and his associ-
 ates, called Comparative Research on the
 Events of Nations (CREON). It is supplemented
 with a separate data collection on IGO member-
 ship for the nations in the sample. We chose the
 CREON data set because it was coded in a way
 which indicated whether a nation's foreign
 policy behavior (or event) occurred within the
 context of an international organization or
 2For a recent informative discussion identifying
 these uses of international organizations, see Butter-
 worth (1978, pp. 7-8).
 outside of it.3 When the behavior occurred
 within an international organization, the name
 of the specific IGO was coded so that we knew
 the exact context in which the foreign policy
 action took place.
 The CREON data consist of 11,665 foreign
 policy events initiated by some 35 nations
 gathered during randomly selected quarters
 (January-March for 1961, 1965; April-June for
 1960, 1963, 1967; July-September for 1964,
 1966; and October-December for 1959, 1962,
 1968) to represent the 1959-1968 decade.
 Although the rationale for the selection of the
 CREON nations, the definition of what consti-
 tutes a foreign policy event, and a description
 of the extensive precautions in collecting and
 coding these events are fully reported elsewhere
 (Hermann et al., 1973, esp. pp. 15-31), we
 need to identify three potential data problems
 in using the CREON data set and to offer some
 caveats about making inferences from it.
 The first potential problem is that only a
 sample of nations is used in the analysis. While
 the set of states in the CREON sample is
 obviously not wholly representative of the
 nations in the international system, nonethe-
 less, a cursory inspection of the CREON list in
 the appendix makes clear that many of the
 principal types of states have been included.
 For example, the CREON nations not only
 represent a wide variation in physical size,
 political orientation, and economic develop-
 ment, but also include all geographical areas of
 the world.
 The second problem is that the CREON data
 are taken from a single source, Deadline Data
 on World Affairs. This necessarily raises the
 question of "source coverage"-a problem en-
 demic to all events data sets. A number of
 studies on this topic have noted that a single
 source is particularly troublesome because of
 the low degree of reporting overlap between
 sources and because of the tendency of some
 3The specific variable from the CREON data set
 that was used to measure behavior within an IGO was
 variable 9. In a few instances (less than 4 percent of
 the total), events occurred within the CREON list of
 international organizations that would not qualify as
 IGOs according to our definition (e.g., "countries
 generally associated with the U.S.," "nonaligned coun-
 tries," etc.). Since these behaviors constitute such a
 small portion of the total, we included them with the
 IGO behavior category for analytic purposes. Each of
 these events, of course, was subsequently classified
 according to the nearest type of IGO as outlined
 below. See the organizational appendix in the CREON
 Project Codebook (Hermann et al., 1975, p. 29) for
 further examples of these instances.
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 newspapers and chronologies to report only
 certain kinds of "newsworthy" events (Azar et
 al., 1972; Doran et al., 1973; Smith, 1969; and
 Scolnick, 1974). In support of their data
 coverage, the CREON investigators point out
 that they used the uncollapsed Deadline Data
 files for their coding procedures (rather than
 the briefer collapsed set usually available) and
 that, in their on-site inspection of the Deadline
 Data operation, summaries of the world press
 were widely used. As they note (Hermann et
 al., 1973, p. 18): "Events for our 35 nations are
 derived from 46 sources of wide geographical,
 functional, and ideological variation ranging,
 for example, from the New York Times to
 Havana Radio to the International Financial
 News Survey to L 'Unite Africaine-all of which
 are abstracted by Deadline Data." Despite this
 coverage, they nevertheless do call for attempts
 to isolate the extent of bias in their data.
 The third potential source of bias is the use
 of yearly quarters to represent years. This is a
 possible problem because some parts of years
 may be more active in international politics
 than others (Hermann et al., 1973, p. 25).
 Thus, some yearly totals may be greater than
 others owing solely to the portion of the year
 sampled. Although Hermann et al. acknowledge
 some differences in their summary description
 of the data, the differences that they report
 between quarters (and thus years) are quite
 small. They range from a low of about 23
 percent of the activity in the first quarter to a
 high of over 26 percent in the third quarter (pp.
 24-25). For this reason, the problem would
 appear to be negligible in altering the results of
 our analysis.
 But this assessment of the data fails to take
 into account foreign policy behavior occurring
 only within IGOs. Would this type of behavior
 be under-represented or over-represented owing
 to the quarter that was sampled? The potential
 problem is that some IGOs tend to have greater
 activity within particular quarters (principally
 the last quarter of the year) and thus would
 more likely be reported and subsequently col-
 lected in the CREON data set. According to our
 breakdown of the yearly data, the percentage
 of IGO behavior within each quarter ranges
 from 6.1 percent for 1960, when the April-June
 quarter is used as the sampling quarter, to 14.1
 percent for 1962 when the October-December
 quarter is used. However, the other quarters are
 within a much narrower range, from 9.3 to 11.6
 percent for the other eight years. Judging from
 these results, it seems that undersampling or
 oversampling of certain IGO behavior is not a
 major constraint upon our investigation. This
 conclusion, however, cannot be hard and fast
 for at least two reasons. First, there is no
 assured way of determining the universe of all
 IGO behavior, dependent as we are upon the
 coverage of the data source. Second, differences
 between quarters (and thus years) also reflect
 real differences in the use of IGOs for foreign
 policy activities; therefore, quarterly differ-
 ences would be expected.
 When we further analyzed the types of IGO
 behavior reported in the quarters, we did find
 different levels of "low politics" and "regional"
 IGO behavior as compared to "high politics"
 and "global" IGO behavior. Again, however,
 the exact source of these differences cannot be
 attributed solely to underreporting but un-
 doubtedly reflect real differences in the level of
 use by nations. On balance, then, our position
 is that particular kinds of IGO activity may be
 somewhat under-represented-owing to the po-
 tential source coverage problem and to the use
 of quarters as yearly representatives-but that
 real differences are also reflected in the data.
 Overall, we do not believe that this potential
 source of error will alter the thrust of our
 general findings because the differences be-
 tween the various IGOs turn out to be quite
 substantial.
 In sum, while we recognize these three
 possible data biases (and thus caution against
 pushing the results too far), we nonetheless
 concur with the CREON investigators that their
 data set does offer a good first approximation
 of the foreign policy behavior of the 35 nations
 sampled. Additionally, and crucially for the
 study at hand, it is the only data set to our
 knowledge that offers a readily available means
 of identifying such behavior in the context of
 IGOs.
 The other part of our data, consisting of
 information on organizational memberships for
 the 35 CREON nations, was taken from the
 Yearbook of International Organizations
 (1969).4 By examining the membership lists of
 the 219 IGOs in the Yearbook, we were able to
 ascertain the extent to which each of the
 CREON nations belonged to them.5 Next we
 4The 1969 edition of the Yearbook was chosen
 because it appeared toward the end of the CREON
 data years (1959-1968) and would likely incorporate
 most of the IGOs that had been in existence through-
 out the period. On occasion, other Yearbooks were
 consulted to ascertain accurate membership infor-
 mation.
 51n the appendix, we note the number of IGOs to
 which each of the CREON nations belonged. Overall, a
 total of 221 distinct IGOs were identified in the
 Yearbook. Of those, two IGOs (International Diplo-
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 coded each of the IGOs according to geographi-
 cal and functional type.6 These two categories
 were chosen because a more exacting break-
 down would seriously reduce the number of
 IGOs in each group and would therefore make
 any analysis more difficult and less useful. More
 importantly, these two categories have direct
 relevance for our subsequent evaluation of the
 regionalist and functionalist arguments. We also
 distinguished between those organizations that
 were either global or regional in membership.
 Such an organizational distinction was usually
 readily apparent when we surveyed the mem-
 bership lists. The only difficulty arose over
 those organizations that had member-states
 derived primarily from one region but which
 also included at least one non-regional member-
 state-the so-called "quasi-regional" organiza-
 tions (Nye, 1971, p. 8). At this point, we made
 a research decision to include these organiza-
 tions within the regional category because there
 were only a limited number of these organiza-
 tions and because we could more easily test the
 regionalist argument.
 Finally, the functional classification also
 divided the intergovernmental organizations in-
 to two groups: each IGO was classified as either
 a "high politics" or a "low politics" organiza-
 tion. The classification scheme was based upon
 Pentland's discussion (1976, pp. 628-29) of
 four types of international organizations: (1)
 diplomatic-military, (2) economic management
 or development, (3) technical-functional, and
 (4) social and cultural. The first category
 formed our "high politics" organizations group
 and the latter three formed the "low politics"
 organizations group. To classify the IGOs, we
 categorized each of the organizations into the
 "high politics" and "low politics" groups using
 the Pentland types as a guide. The title and our
 knowledge of the IGOs were usually sufficient
 for this task. However, this classificatory task
 was made easier by consulting the various
 functional breakdowns (some 28 in all) em-
 ployed in the 1974 Yearbook. These served as
 valuable guides to the identification of the main
 matic Academy and International Children's Centre)
 were excluded from the analysis. For the former, it
 was not possible to locate an accurate membership list
 despite numerous attempts. For the latter, the organi-
 zation did not prove to be one consisting of individual
 nations as members.
 6The behavior data occurring within IGOs (and
 extracted from CREON variable 9) were subsequently
 collapsed into global, regional, high politics, and low
 politics IGO behavior following essentially the same
 procedure discussed for the IGO membership data.
 activities of each organization. Despite these 28
 categories, though, it was sometimes necessary
 to go to a description of the activities of the
 IGOs within the Yearbook in order to classify
 them. Additionally, when an IGO seemed to
 engage in both high and low politics activities,
 we had to make a judgment regarding its
 primary activity. This occurred only in rare
 instances.
 Findings
 Extent of IGO Use by the CREON Nations.
 The first part of Table 1 shows the extent to
 which IGOs have been used by the CREON
 states as a forum for conducting foreign policy.
 According to these results, 66.1 percent of
 foreign policy actions (calculated by averaging
 the percentages of use by each nation) were
 taken within the context of IGOs for the period
 1959-1968.7 For the yearly breakdowns,
 7These percentages were calculated in the following
 way: (1) the foreign policy events (or behavior) for
 each nation were divided into those that occurred
 within and outside IGOs; (2) percentages of behavior
 within each category were then calculated for each
 nation; and (3) mean percentages for both categories
 were computed (only the percentages of behavior
 within IGOs are portrayed in Table 1 for each year
 and in total). The figures in parentheses in the first
 part of Table 1 are the number of foreign policy
 events contributed by all nations for the particular
 year and in total. We calculated the rest of the
 percentages in Table 1 and all the percentages in
 Tables 3 and 4 using a similar format.
 It is important to emphasize that the percentages
 shown are the mean percentages of behavior which we
 calculated by averaging the mean percentages for each
 individual nation. We believe this measure is more
 meaningful than simply calculating the mean level of
 foreign policy events across a year or in total, as has
 been done in past research. This latter approach fails
 to take into account the relative contribution of each
 nation. For example, active states with many foreign
 policy actions in one category could disproportionate-
 ly skew the results when events are the unit of
 analysis. This is less likely to be the case when the
 nation is the unit of analysis.
 At this juncture, we should emphasize that we have
 not attempted to measure the importance of the kinds
 of foreign policy behavior undertaken within or
 outside IGOs; rather, our concern is the use of these
 organizations for foreign policy purposes. Nations
 obviously do not use IGOs for matters of equal
 importance; some nations use IGOs to state their
 political beliefs about the world, others request
 collective security action by an organization. Compari-
 sons based upon the frequency of such use have their
 limitations; however, we hope to extend the research
 later to assess types of IGO use. Until that is
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 moreover, IGO use still remained over 50
 percent for every year. What is interesting to
 note is the lack of great fluctuation in the use
 of IGOs even in a period marked by a rise in the
 number of such organizations. Thus it appears
 that IGO use was not seriously affected by the
 growth of such organizations during this dec-
 ade.
 Focusing only on the behavior within IGOs,
 we next determine whether there have been any
 differences in the pattern of use between
 geographical and functional IGOs for foreign
 completed, though, our present analysis can begin to
 reveal some useful information about IGO use in
 international politics.
 policy purposes (also see Table 1).8 For the
 geographical dimension, regional IGOs had con-
 siderably less importance than did global IGOs
 as the forum for foreign policy during the
 1 960s. In the aggregate, regional organizations
 8Some illustrations of the kinds of foreign policy
 behavior that took place within regional/global and
 low politics/high politics IGOs may be helpful at this
 point. For instance, activities ranged from Belgium
 declaring in the United Nations Security Council that
 it is categorically opposed to the secession of Katanga
 Province, to France opposing the 25 percent general
 quota increase in the International Monetary Fund, to
 Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda signing a preferential
 trade agreement with the European Common Market
 to the Ivory Coast signing the International Coffee
 Agreement sponsored by the United Nations.
 Table 1. Foreign Policy Behavior and IGO Use of the CREON Nations
 by Context and Types of IGOs
 By Context By Types of IGOsb
 Percent
 Percent Percent Within
 Within Within Low Politics
 IGOs Regional IGOs IGOs
 1959 80.5c N=32 ( 876)d 27.1 34.6 N=31 ( 626)e
 1960 59.5 N=32 ( 846) 44.5 21.0 N=31 ( 346)
 1961 70.9 N=32 ( 1083) 31.4 18.1 N=32 ( 605)
 1962 70.6 N=33 ( 1567) 29.3 25.8 N=33 ( 888)
 1963 63.8 N=33 ( 1357) 36.8 18.5 N=31 ( 726)
 1964 68.2 N=34 ( 1305) 25.3 73.2 N=33 ( 731)
 1965 56.9 N=35 ( 1035) 25.8 47.7 N=34 ( 386)
 1966 67.7 N=35 ( 1140) 18.2 68.6 N=34 ( 711)
 1967 51.6 N=35 ( 1397) 35.3 36.5 N=34 ( 590)
 1968 70.9 N=35 ( 1059) 14.4 28.0 N=34 ( 659)
 Total 66.1f N=336 (11,665) 28.6 37.6 N=327 (6318)
 Source: CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set, 1959-1968.
 aContext in Tables 1 and 3 refers to foreign policy behavior occurring within or outside IGOs.
 bFor all tables, regional IGOs are organizations whose memberships are restricted to a particular geographical
 area while global IGOs are organizations whose memberships are open to all states. Low politics IGOs are those
 which deal with issues of economic, technical, and social-cultural affairs while high politics IGOs are those which
 deal with issues of political and military affairs. The text describes the procedures used in coding these
 organizations.
 cEntries represent the mean percentages of behavior within each category. These were computed by averaging
 the mean percentages for each nation in a particular year (or in total). The percentages shown subtracted from
 100 give the percentage of foreign policy behavior outside IGOs, within global IGOs, and within high politics
 IGOs, respectively.
 dThe Ns represent the number of CREON nations that acted within and/or outside IGOs for each year. (The
 N for the total category is the sum of the Ns for the individual years.) The figures in parentheses are the number
 of foreign policy events contributed by all nations in the particular year or in total.
 eThe Ns represent the number of CREON nations that acted within regional and/or global IGOs as well as
 within low politics and/or high politics IGOs. (They are the same for these different types.) The N for the total
 category is the sum of the Ns for the individual years. The figures in parentheses are the number of foreign
 policy events contributed by all nations in the particular year or in total.
 fDifference of means tests were calculated for within/outside, regional/global and low politics/high politics
 percentages. All were significant beyond the .001 level.
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 were not employed more frequently than global
 organizations. The average use of these regional
 IGOs was under 29 percent, while the average
 use of global IGOs was about 71 percent. For
 the functional dimension, high politics IGOs
 were employed most frequently; these organiza-
 tions were used about 62 percent of the time
 while the low politics organizations were used
 less than 38 percent of the time. Nonetheless,
 low politics organizations were used extensively
 in three particular years-1964, 1965, and
 1966-but the pattern of such use was not
 sustained across the other seven years. On the
 whole, then, we must emphasize that the low
 politics IGOs were used infrequently during the
 1960s.
 These sets of results seem to call into
 question some of the regionalist and functional-
 ist arguments regarding international organiza-
 tions. First of all, our findings for the
 1959-1968 period imply that regional organi-
 zations have not gained much currency as
 foreign policy arenas for the CREON nations.
 Thus our results do not seem very encouraging
 for the theoretical arguments which suggest
 that regional organizations may be important
 means of creating "islands of peace" in the
 international system (Nye, 1971; Yalem, 1965;
 and Falk and Mendlovitz, 1973). Despite the
 rapid development of regional IGOs, the use of
 such organizations for foreign policy apparently
 has not accelerated at a similar pace. In fact, a
 plot of the regional IGO data over time shows a
 small but consistent downturn in use.
 The data in Table 1 also seem not to support
 the functionalist position (Mitrany, 1943; Haas,
 1964; Sewell, 1966; Claude, 1971, pp.
 378-407; and Pentland, 1973, pp. 64-146).
 According to this view, low politics concerns
 are less controversial than high politics concerns
 and are thus more likely to foster the process of
 multilateral cooperation. If this argument
 holds, we should see the use of IGOs expand in
 low politics areas and eventually into the high
 politics areas, too. Our aggregate trend data for
 the low politics organizations, however, do not
 seem to support such a view; rather, we detect a
 slight downturn over the years, despite the brief
 1964-1966 upswing. This result is somewhat
 surprising when one recalls that the low politics
 organizations have increased more rapidly than
 any other type of intergovernmental organiza-
 tion (Pentland, 1976, p. 628). Since our infer-
 ences are based upon an analysis of a particular
 time span, both of these conclusions regarding
 the regionalist and functionalist arguments
 must remain tentative. We shall, however, have
 more to say about each conclusion as we
 analyze the linkage between IGO membership
 and IGO use, and the characteristics of nations
 that employ IGOs.
 IGO Membership and IGO Use. Table 2 shows
 correlations between IGO membership data for
 each nation (total membership, global member-
 ship, regional membership, high politics mem-
 bership, low politics membership, and the
 various combination of these) with the appro-
 priate foreign policy use by each state within
 these types of organizations.9 The first impor-
 tant finding is that total membership and total
 use do produce a significant correlation, albeit a
 negative one (-.36). Because it is negative, the
 correlation implies that the more IGOs a nation
 belongs to, the less it uses these organizations
 for foreign policy purposes. Such a result
 suggests that increased membership ties have
 not necessarily produced increased IGO use;
 rather, these organizations have been utilized
 much more selectively.
 There are some exceptions to this conclusion
 which qualify what we said earlier about the
 regionalist and functionalist arguments. As also
 indicated in Table 2, regional IGO membership
 and regional IGO use show a significant positive
 correlation of .39, while global membership and
 global IGO use produce an insignificant nega-
 tive correlation of -.25. The implication of the
 first statistic is that regional ties have had a
 positive impact on nations using such IGOs: the
 more a nation joins regional IGOs, the more
 likely it is to use them for foreign policy
 behavior. A parallel statement cannot be made
 for global organizations. (In fact, the global
 data suggest an insignificant inverse relation-
 ship.) In this sense, those who argue for a
 regionalist approach to solving international
 problems can find some solace in these results.
 Thus, although global IGOs are most widely
 used, the degree of correspondence between
 joining IGOs and actually using them appears
 more evident in regional IGOs.
 The other significant results from Table 2
 are the correlations for the high politics and
 low politics organizations. Membership in high
 politics IGOs is inversely related to their use
 (-.64), while membership in low politics IGOs
 is positively correlated with use in these organi-
 9The exact procedure for obtaining these correla-
 tions was as follows. We first calculated membership
 "scores" for the CREON nations in each of the
 membership categories (global, regional, etc.). Next we
 computed the percentage of IGO behavior for each
 nation within each similar organizational category.
 Finally, we correlated the appropriate pair with one
 another using the Pearson product-moment correlation
 coefficient.
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 zations (.47). What this first correlation seems
 to suggest is that the nations with few such
 memberships use them extensively. For exam-
 ple, CREON nations like Ivory Coast, Guinea,
 Ghana, and Egypt, among others, held few
 memberships in high politics organizations, yet
 a large portion of their foreign policy behavior
 occurred within these organizations. Converse-
 ly, CREON nations like France, West Germany,
 Japan, and Italy, among others, which belonged
 to many high politics organizations used them
 less extensively for their IGO foreign policy
 activities. Both of these patterns within the
 high politics organizations contribute to the
 negative correlation that we obtained. By way
 of contrast, the percentage of IGO behavior
 within the low politics organizations roughly
 corresponded to the extent of memberships in
 these organizations by the CREON nations. The
 more memberships in these low politics organi-
 zations, the greater the use of such organiza-
 tions for foreign policy.
 Such results suggest that a closer linkage
 exists between memberships in low politics
 organizations and using them for foreign policy
 purposes than for high politics organizations. In
 this limited sense, the functionalist argument
 seems to garner some support. Moreover, this
 position is enhanced even more if one considers
 that the only other significant correlation in
 Table 2 is for regional low politics (.51). But
 again, while such trends are encouraging to the
 functionalist position, they must be tempered
 by the fact that the high politics organizations
 are most extensively used (Table 1).
 National Attributes and IGO Use. The first set
 of figures in Table 3 shows the relative use of
 IGOs (as compared to other means of conduct-
 ing foreign policy) controlling for the size of
 the nation, the level of economic development,
 and a combination of these two factors. Evi-
 dently, small states have used IGOs to a much
 greater extent than large states; the degree of
 difference is quite substantial-73 percent as
 compared to 52 percent. When we compare this
 difference between large and small states with
 what we obtained for the development dimen-
 sion or for a combined size and development
 dimension (although this one reaches statistical
 significance), size still appears to be the more
 discriminating factor in accounting for relative
 IGO use. Moreover, this finding suggests that
 small states see IGOs as a particularly good way
 to carry on foreign policy at a relatively low
 cost (East, 1973, p. 565).
 When we examine behavior within IGOs,
 however, the relative size of the nation does not
 seem to be the key factor that accounts for
 differences in use of the geographical and
 functional IGOs (also see Table 3). In fact, for
 the global/regional IGO breakdown, none of
 the national attribute characteristics produces
 significant differences in the relative use of
 these organizations. Although all states use
 global IGOs more extensively than regional
 IGOs, the differences between types of states
 are always small and statistically insignificant.
 Even when we combine these two dimensions
 (section C of Table 3), we do not find larger
 differences between the states. Thus our analy-
 sis by type of state does not differentiate
 among patterns of use within geographical
 types of organizations. For the functional
 breakdown, on the other hand, the results are
 somewhat more encouraging. While neither size
 nor a combination of size and development
 produces statistically significant differences, the
 level of economic development does. Develop-
 ing states use high politics IGOs significantly
 Table 2. Intercorrelations between IGO Membership and IGO Use by the CREON Nations,
 1959-1968
 Total Membership and Total Use (N=35) -.36*
 Global Membership and Global Use (N=34) -.25
 Regional Membership and Regional Use (N=34) .39*
 High Politics Membership and High Politics Use (N=34) -.64**
 Low Politics Membership and Low Politics Use (N=35) .47**
 Global High Politics Membership and Global High Politics Use (N=33) -.06
 Global Low Politics Membership and Global Low Politics Use (N=33) .01
 Regional High Politics Membership and Regional High Politics Use (N=28) -.18
 Regional Low Politics Membership and Regional Low Politics Use (N=28) .51 **
 Source: CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set 1959-1968 and Yearbook of
 International Organizations, 12th ed. (1969). Brussels: Union of International Associations.
 Note: Entries are Pearson rs. N=12
 *Significant beyond .05.
 **Significant beyond .01.
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 more than developed states, while the latter use
 low politics IGOs significantly more than devel-
 oping states.
 What this analysis implies is that poor states,
 irrespective of size, tend to employ IGOs that
 will gain them the most political and economic
 benefits. These are more often the global and
 high politics organizations. Such results are
 generally consistent with some previous find-
 ings on small/large state behavior, although we
 find that the developing/developed dimension is
 more potent. A previous study (East, 1973, p.
 576), for instance, discovered that small states
 tend to act more selectively in conducting
 foreign policy than do large states and tend to
 seek maximum impact with their actions. A
 similar pattern appears to occur for the devel-
 oping states in our data; they tend to be
 selective in their employment of IGOs and seek
 the greatest payoff when they use them-pri-
 marily through the global and high politics
 IGOs. Finally, this set of results highlights the
 fact that developed states are apparently the
 only kinds of nations that have a sufficient
 resource base and a large enough foreign policy
 bureaucracy to use global, regional, and low
 politics organizations simultaneously.
 We can obtain an even clearer picture of the
 relative utility of these national attributes in
 differentiating among levels of IGO use by one
 final analysis. Table 4 presents levels of IGO use
 by the four types of states with a more refined
 categorization of IGOs (global high politics,
 global low politics, regional high politics, and
 regional low politics). All states use global high
 politics organizations to a much greater extent
 than any other type of IGO. Usage ranges from
 41 percent for large developed states to 59
 percent for large developing states. But these
 differences prove to be statistically insignificant
 by our analysis of variance test; therefore, we
 must conclude that, even here, the type of state
 does not have any substantial impact on the use
 of global high politics organizations. A similar
 Table 3. Foreign Policy Behavior and IGO Use of the CREON Nations by Context
 and Types of IGOs, Controlling for Size and Developmenta
 By Context By Types of IGOs
 Percent
 Percent Percent Within
 Within Within Low Politics
 IGOs Regional IGOs IGOs
 A. By Size
 Small States 73.3*b N=23 (4709)C 29.2 35.2 N=23 (3353)d
 Large States 51.6 N=12 (6956) 30.8 37.1 N=12 (2965)
 B. By Development
 Developing States 68.6 N=15 (3498) 27.7 27.9* N=15 (2102)
 Developed States 63.8 N=20 (8167) 31.3 41.8 N=20 (4216)
 C. By Size and Development
 Small Developing 77.2* N=12 (2241) 27.5 30.8 N=12 (1490)
 Small Developed 69.1 N=l1 (2468) 30.1 41.7 N=l1 (1863)
 Large Developing 34.2 N= 3 (1257) 25.2 22.8 N= 3 ( 392)
 Large Developed 57.4 N= 9 (5699) 32.7 41.9 N= 9 (2573)
 Source: CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set, 1959-1968.
 aFor a discussion of how the CREON nations were classified by size and development and a listing of nations
 in each category for Tables 3 and 4, see the appendix.
 bEntries represent the mean percentages of behavior within each category. These were computed by averaging
 the mean percentages for each nation. The percentages shown subtracted from 100 give the percentage of foreign
 policy behavior outside IGOs, within global IGOs, and within high politics IGOs, respectively.
 CThe Ns represent the number of CREON nations that acted within and/or outside IGOs by type of state. The
 figures in parentheses are the number of foreign policy events contributed by each type of nation.
 dThe Ns represent the number of CREON nations that acted within regional and/or global IGOs as well as
 within low politics and/or high politics IGOs. (They are the same for these different types.) The figures in
 parentheses are the number of foreign policy events contributed by each type of nation.
 *Significant differences beyond the .05 level for difference of means test and one-way analysis of variance.
 Because there was not homogeneity of variances for the low politics analysis of variance, the Kruskal-Wallis test
 was employed. The result was not significant.
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 conclusion results for the global low politics
 analysis. All types of CREON nations use these
 organizations at about the same rate, except for
 the large developing states. This difference is
 undoubtedly attributable to the fact that China
 failed to use these organizations at all during
 the ten years of our data base. The regional
 high politics and low politics organizations,
 however, exhibit some differences; small devel-
 oping states use the former most frequently,
 and the developed states use the latter most
 often. But here, too, we cannot say much more
 about these differences since all fail to reach
 conventional levels of statistical significance.
 Thus this more refined analysis by the four
 types of IGOs fails to improve our earlier
 limited results on national attributes and IGO
 use.
 On balance, then, national attributes do not
 seem to delineate IGO use very effectively.
 Instead, we must conclude that the level of IGO
 use is related less to the type of state and more
 to the type of intergovernmental organization
 under consideration.
 Conclusion
 These findings on the use of IGOs for
 foreign policy behavior have some important
 substantive and theoretical implications. First
 of all, while the aggregate use of IGOs for
 foreign policy has been quite substantial over
 the decade of our analysis (averaging over 60
 percent), traditional interstate procedures for
 conducting foreign affairs have remained rela-
 tively stable. This is evidenced by the lack of an
 increase in the level of IGO use over time,
 despite a growth in the number of these
 organizations. Thus, the enlargement of the
 network of IGOs does not appear to have
 affected appreciably the existing pattern of
 nation-state relations. The actual pattern of
 IGO use seems consistent with the realist's
 description of the limited role of intergovern-
 mental organizations: IGOs are used by nations
 primarily as selective instruments for gaining
 foreign policy objectives.
 A second finding buttresses this conclusion
 regarding the realist argument. Our data also
 show that increased institutional ties in world
 politics have generally not been translated into
 increased use of IGOs-at least for the years
 1959 to 1968. Contrary to our initial expecta-
 tions, institutional growth and usage have been
 inversely related. In this sense, while formal ties
 between states have expanded in recent years,
 the degree of IGO use for foreign policy has not
 increased correspondingly. For the regional and
 low politics IGOs, however, this observation is
 less applicable. In these instances, increased
 membership is tied to increased use. In a
 limited way, then, the regionalist and function-
 alist arguments have some validity for enhanc-
 ing the level of multilateral activities and for
 constructing a web of interdependence among
 sovereign states. Put differently, the functional
 agencies have had some impact on altering the
 prominence of bilateral diplomacy for carrying
 on interstate relations. However, we must em-
 phasize the limited nature of this functional
 strategy of international cooperation in light of
 our overall results.
 A third major finding-the prominent use of
 high politics organizations by all types of
 Table 4. IGO Use by the CREON Nations for
 Four Types of IGOs and States (Percent)
 Type of IGO
 Global Global Regional Regional
 High Low High Low
 Small Developing 43.3a 29.2 25.9 1.6 N=12 (1490)b
 Small Developed 42.3 27.5 16.0 14.1 N=11 (1863)
 Large Developing 58.7 16.1 18.5 6.7 N- 3 ( 392)
 Large Developed 40.7c 26.8 16.8 15.7 N= 9 (2573)
 Source: CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set, 1959-1968.
 aEntries represent the mean percentages of behavior within each category. These were computed by averaging
 the mean percentages for each nation in a given category. Totals do not always add to 100% due to rounding
 error.
 bThe Ns represented the number of CREON nations that acted within the various IGOs. The figures in
 parentheses are the number of foreign policy events contributed by each type of nation.
 COne-way analysis of variance (by type of state) was calculated for the four types of IGOs. All results were
 insignificant. Because there was not homogeneity of variances for the regional low politics organizations, the
 Kruskal-Wallis test was employed. The result was not significant.
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 states-further demonstrates the limitation of
 this functional perspective. The high politics
 organizations-political and military ones-
 dominate the level of use even in a period when
 the low politics IGOs-the economic, technical,
 and social-cultural ones-grew more rapidly.
 Thus the success of the functional approach to
 international institution-building seems mainly
 confined to the low politics arena and has not
 appreciably affected the high politics ones. Also
 the fact that IGO membership in these organi-
 zations does not correlate positively with IGO
 use implies that the use of high politics IGOs is
 a selective one, apparently keyed to achieving
 specific foreign policy objectives. Our last
 finding-the tendency for developing states to
 use global and high politics organizations more
 extensively than regional and low politics or-
 ganizations-also emphasizes the basic utilitari-
 an nature of IGO use. Because the poor states
 cannot use all types of IGOs (constrained as
 they are by domestic resource requirements),
 they tend to select the ones most likely to gain
 them the maximum benefit.
 The constraints of the CREON data set do
 not allow us to go further and make more
 definitive statements about the total impact of
 IGOs in altering foreign policy behavior. Never-
 theless, the thrust of our results points to one
 important conclusion: despite the growth in the
 number of IGOs during the 1960s, the usage of
 these organizations for foreign policy purposes
 remained unchanged. Whether this pattern
 holds for the 1970s is certainly open to
 question, especially in light of a changing
 international system, increasingly characterized
 as "complex" and "interdependent" (Keohane
 and Nye, 1977). Our evidence for the 1960s,
 Appendix. List of Total IGO Memberships and Foreign Policy Actions
 for the CREON Nations, Controlling for Size and Development
 Small Developing Small Developed
 Costa Rica 174a (57)b Belgium 385 (105)
 Ghana 272 (48) Chile 204 ( 64)
 Guinea 215 (29) Cuba 325 ( 51)
 Ivory Coast 180 (56) East Germany 165 ( 5)
 Kenya 97 (49) Iceland 177 ( 48)
 Lebanon 160 (43) Israel 321 ( 56)
 Philippines 214 (47) New Zealand 211 ( 55)
 Thailand 162 (51) Norway 234 ( 75)
 Tunisia 277 (58) Switzerland 72 ( 71)
 Uganda 154 (50) Uruguay 150 ( 51)
 Yugoslavia 256 (56) Venezuela 224 ( 65)
 Zambia 80 (34)
 Large Developing Large Developed
 China 455 (30) Canada 394 ( 70)
 India 490 (71) France 849 (118)
 Turkey 312 (66) Italy 431 (100)
 Japan 273 ( 71)
 Mexico 190 ( 75)
 Spain 173 ( 74)
 USSR 965 ( 49)
 USA 1880 ( 87)
 West Germany 544 ( 95)
 Source: The classification by size and development is drawn from Philip M. Burgess (1970), "Nation-typing for
 Foreign Policy Analysis: A Partitioning Procedure for Constructing Typologies," in Edwin H. Fedder (ed.),
 Methodological Concerns in International Studies, St. Louis: Center for International Studies, pp. 3-66. Table 4
 from Appendix A and Appendix B were used because they provided the "best" partitions. The cut-off point for
 dividing between large and small states was a population greater than and less than 23.7 million, and for dividing
 between developed and developing states was a GNP per capita greater than and less than $401. For the
 "misclassifications" even with these partitions (for Cuba in the development category; for Canada, Philippines,
 and Thailand in the size category), the composite results were employed to classify these states. See pp. 19-21
 for this discussion. For another use of the Burgess scheme in attribute analysis, see Maurice A. East (1973), "Size
 and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World Politics, 25: 556-76.
 aNumber of foreign policy events initiated by each nation, calculated from the CREON (Comparative
 Research on the Events of Nations) data set, 1959-1968.
 bNumber of IGOs to which each nation belonged, calculated from the 1969 Yearbook of International
 Organizations, 12th ed., Brussels: Union of International Associations.
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 however, should serve as a caution against
 drawing premature conclusions.
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